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Resumen
Este artículo presenta una evaluación empírica del aporte de las reservas internacionales vis- à -vis
variables institucionales para reducir el riesgo de una crisis cambiaria. Se encuentra que la razón entre
reservas y endeudamiento de corto plazo es robusta en explicar las crisis internacionales, aun después
de controlar por desarrollo financiero y variables políticas. Sobre la base de nuestras estimaciones
sobre probabilidad de crisis, calculamos el nivel óptimo de reservas para un grupo de economías de
Asia Oriental y para Chile. Los resultados de este ejercicio resultan ser muy sensibles a los datos
utilizados y a los supuestos referidos al costo de la crisis. De acuerdo con nuestra estimación central,
concluimos el actual stock de reservas en la mayoría de los casos es coherente con una política óptima
de auto aseguramiento bajo supuestos razonables sobre el costo de una crisis.
Abstract
We empirically assess the contribution of international reserves vis- à -vis institutional variables in
reducing the risk of a currency crisis. We find that the ratio of reserves to short-term debt is robust in
explaining international crisis, even after controlling for financial development and political variables.
Based on our estimates on crisis probabilities we compute the optimal level of reserves for a set of
East Asian economies and for Chile. The results of this exercise turn out to be very sensitive to the
data utilized and to the assumptions regarding the cost of a crisis. For our benchmark estimate we
conclude that the current stocks of reserves for most of the cases are consistent with an optimal self-
insurance policy under reasonable assumptions regarding the cost of a crisis.
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Over the last few years, several Asian economies have accumulated large
stocks of international reserves. This motivates the question we ambitiously
attempt to answer from an empirical point of view. Are these large increases
in reserves an eﬃcient crisis-prevention strategy? Or are they rather second-
best to other options, such as improving governance and the development of
better institutions in the ﬁnancial markets? The current literature has not
reached a ﬁrm consensus.
While it has been argued that reserve accumulation allows to reduce the
likelihood of self-fulﬁlling speculative attacks,1 it has also been stressed that
reserve accumulation is a relatively costly self-insurance strategy, and it can
be actually counterproductive, while crises are likely to be deeper in the
presence of weak ﬁnancial systems.2
In this paper we ﬁrst estimate a model to quantify the impact of inter-
national liquidity on the probability of a crisis. Our goal is to evaluate how
robust are reserves —or the lack of them— in explaining crises, in particular,
after controlling for the quality of political institutions and the soundness of
the ﬁnancial system. We then utilize our estimates to evaluate the optimal
level of reserves from a cost-beneﬁt analysis for a selected group of East
Asian economies and for Chile.
Our results lead us to the conclusion that recent trends in reserve ac-
cumulation by some Asian economies seems to be a sensible approach to
dealing with the current macroeconomic conditions in the world economy.
The empirical evidence we present indicates that the probability of crisis is
still strongly related to this ratio of reserves to short term debt even when
controlling for political and ﬁnancial system variables, while the actual size
of the reserve stock observed today is not far from what would be implied
by the usual cost of crises.
Our work is framed around two existing strands of the literature on in-
ternational reserves. The ﬁrst one is the role of reserves as an indicator
for ﬁnancial or currency crisis in the context of the Early Warning Sys-
tem (EWS) literature.3 Typically in this literature, an exchange market
1See, for example, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Chang and Velasco (1999), and
Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001).
2These points have been particularly noted in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999),
(2000) and (2001).
3See Frenkel and Rose (1996), Berg and Pattillo (1999), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco
(1996), and Berg, Borensztein, Milesi-Ferretti and Pattillo (1999).
1pressure variable is constructed combining increases in interest rates, the
exchange rate and rapid reserve depletion. This variable attempts to sum-
marize the magnitude of speculative behavior over a wide range of possible
policy responses and regimes, and therefore is not restricted to speciﬁcc i r -
cumstances, such as depreciations after periods of ﬁxed exchange rates. An
indicator variable is created, and it takes the value of 1 if exchange market
pressure is above a pre-speciﬁed crisis threshold. The second step in this
procedure is to regress this indicator on a set of right-hand-side variables,
typically including the ratio of reserves to short term debt and the misalign-
ment of the real exchange rate. Thus, in this framework an observer of these
variables should be able to assess the likelihood of a currency crisis.
Although we follow the logic of this basic approach in our work, we
extend the empirical methodology in two directions. The ﬁrst one is the
inclusion of diﬀerent variables to capture the eﬀect of ﬁnancial depth on
the likelihood of a crisis. We test whether a more deep and liquid domestic
ﬁnancial system is related to a lower probability of crisis. The second one
is the inclusion of governance variables. Weaker political institutions are
more prone to deal feebly with ﬁnancial stress, as either they do not have
the correct incentives (because of corruption), they lack technical expertise,
or because their policy actions are not credible to market participants. Our
results indicate that the eﬀect of the ratio of reserves to short term debt
on crisis probability is robust to the inclusion of these two sets of variables,
and that the selected ﬁnancial and political variables have an empirically
ambiguous or weak relationship with the probability of a crisis.
The second strand of the literature on which we base our work is the
standard model of reserves demand. We use a simple model that relates the
optimal level of reserves to their opportunity cost as well as the expected
cost of crises. By assuming reasonable values for the latter, we compute
theoretical optimal levels for reserves and compare them to actual recent
stocks hold by a number of Asian countries and for Chile. We ﬁnd that for
cost of crises between 5 and 15% of GDP the actual ratio of reserves to short
term debt in some of these selected Asian countries is below to the optimal
level derived from the model. At the same time, the implicit cost of a crisis
that is consistent with the actual level of reserves held by those countries is
in the range of a soft to mild crisis. These results, however, turn out to be
very sensitive to the data utilized and the speciﬁcation of the model for the
crisis probability.
Our approach to explain reserves accumulation emphasizes the role of
international liquidity as a tool to self-insure against external shocks. An
alternative explanation for the large reserves accumulation by East Asian
2economies has been put forward by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber
(2003 and 2004). According to these authors this large reserves accumulation
—in particular, by China— would correspond in part to a export-oriented
development strategy, where governments attempt to systematically keep
the real exchange rate undervalued by accumulating reserves. In this paper
we do not explore further this hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describe some re-
cent trends in reserves accumulation by emerging economies. Section three
presents the empirical methodology utilized to estimate the probability of a
crisis and discusses the main results. Section four computes the optimal level
of reserves for a selected group of Asian countries and for Chile. Finally,
section ﬁve concludes.
2 Recent trends in reserve accumulation
One of the most remarkable features of the recent trend in reserves is the
large accumulation by East Asian economies (EAE). By the end of 2003
four EAE —China, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand— held roughly 25% of
total world’s international reserves.
These countries have systematically increased their reserve holdings over
the last years. When measured as a percentage of GDP reserves in these four
EAE on average went from roughly 10% by the end of the 80s up to close
to 30% by 2002. But not only reserves have increased relative to the size of
those economies. If we measure reserves relative to short-term external debt
(STD) we observe a similar pattern. In fact, the ratio of reserves to STD
went from 2.5 on average for those four countries in 1990 up to 5 by 2002.
These ﬁgures are heavily inﬂuenced by the trend followed by reserves in
China, which increased from less than 10% of GDP by 1990 to more than
25% of GDP by 2002, and to a lesser extent by the trend followed by Korea
and Thailand (see ﬁgure 1). Korea held a relatively constant fraction of
GDP in reserves (about 5%) until the Asian crisis. After 1998 it increased
its holding of reserves dramatically up to 25% of GDP in 2002. Thailand
has increased systematically its reserves as a fraction of GDP over the 90s.
However, this country also received large capital inﬂows over these years
—until the Asian crisis. Therefore, its reserves to STD ratio actually felt
from 1990 until 1998. After that year reserves measured both as a fraction
of GDP and STD have increased systematically.
Malaysia held a relative large stock-pile of reserves over the 90s, both
measured has a fraction of GDP (30% on average) and STD (more than
3twice its stock of STD on average). Both ratios felt until the Asian crisis
but have grown since then.
Not only East Asian economies have accumulated large amounts of in-
ternational liquidity. Emerging market economies (EME) in general have
followed a similar pattern, though to a lesser extent. As a share of GDP
reserves in emerging market economies went from approximately 5% by the
end of the 80s up to 16% by 2002 (ﬁgure 3).4 When measured with respect
to short term external liabilities, reserves in EAE have also increased sys-
tematically from the beginning of the 90s, despite the large capital inﬂows
to those economies during this period. On average the ratio of reserves to
GDP in emerging market economies went from approximately 1 in 1990 up
to 2.4 in 2002 (see ﬁgure 4).
3 Reserve accumulation and crisis probability
Recent literature on international crisis emphasizes the role of international
reserves in preventing ﬁnancial or currency crisis.5 Rather than being a
buﬀer to absorb current account transitory shock —as it was emphasized in
the literature on reserves adequacy of the 50s and 60s— reserves are perceived
as a tool to reduce the incidence of international crisis.
This role of international reserves has been widely analyzed in recent
years, both theoretically and empirically. However, it has been only during
recent years that the quantitative contribution of reserves in terms of re-
ducing the risk of a crisis has been analyzed. Bussiere and Mulder (1999),
for example, ﬁnd that the short-term debt to reserves ratio is signiﬁcant
in predicting crisis. Moreover, these authors quantify how much liquidity
(reserves) countries should have in order to counteract weak fundamentals
and avoid crisis.
In this section we follow the EWS literature to quantitatively estimate
the robustness of the contribution of reserves in reducing the probability of
an international crises.
3.1 Empirical Approach
Usually the literature posits a speciﬁcation that relates the probability of a
crisis to the ratio of reserves to a selected scaling variable and a number of
4In contrast, developed economies have kept a relatively constant ratio of reserves to
GDP of about 6% since mid 80s.
5On the theoretical literature see for example, Calvo (1996), Chang and Velasco (1999),
Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001)
4other controls. Consistent with recent theoretical emphasis on liquidity to
explain crisis we consider as a scaling variable the short-term debt of the
country.
For the sake of simplicity, we denominate pi,t the probability of a crisis in
country i at time t, and assume that it is a function of a linear combination
of the reserves to short-term debt ratio at the beginning of period t, Ri,t/Si,t,
the total debt to GDP ratio, Di,t/Yi,t, another set of variables contained in









+ Zi,tγ −  i,t
¸
(1)
In this formulation the ratio reserves to short-term debt is a measure of
the liquidity of the economy, and the ratio total debt to GDP is a proxy for
solvency. Therefore, we have that β0 < 0,a n dβ1 > 0.
We estimate the crisis probability by using a panel of countries with
yearly observations. To deﬁne a crisis episode we use the standard measure
of exchange market pressure (EMP), by constructing a weighted average of








where reri,t is the average real exchange of country i during year t,a n dw h e r e
Ri,t is the level of reserves (real) at the end of year t. Weights correspond
to the inverse of the variance of each variable for all countries over the full
sample. A crisis episode occurs in period t in country if EMPi,t exceeds a




1 if EMPi,t > EMPi +2 SD(EMPi)
0 otherwise
(3)
In this framework, the crisis probability corresponds to the probability of
the event Yi,t =1 . This probability cannot be measured ex-ante, as only the
eﬀective ex-post occurrence of crises can be observed. Moreover, the latter
hinges on the particular deﬁnition of the threshold value X. For the sake
6Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) utilize a similar measure. However, they also consider
pressures absorbed by interest rate movements. In our case, since we utilize a longer
time span, and annual data incorporating interest rate movements would have decreased
signiﬁcantly the data. Other works that utilize a similar crisis indicator are Kamin and
Babson (1999), and Krueger, Osakwe and Page (1998).
5of our main argument, we will abstract from these considerations for now,
and assume that there is a well deﬁned function that relates macroeconomic
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. (4)
Equation 4 indicates that the probability of a crisis occurring in period
t is a non-linear function F of a linear combination of the reserves to short-
term debt ratio and other variables included in vector Zi,t, such as the
real exchange rate deviation from its fundamental or long run value, GDP
growth, and the exchange rate regime.
For the empirical application we assume F is a logistic function. In other
















Yi,t + Zi,tγ −  i,t
´ (5)
3.2 Quantifying the eﬀect of reserves on crisis probability
This subsection presents benchmark estimates of crisis probability. Estima-
tions were made using a logit model with yearly observations for the period
1975-2003. From these estimates two of the results found in the literature
stand out most clearly, despite of the lower frequency of our data and the
longer time span. First, a lower ratio of reserves to STD and other measures
of liabilities, by the end of a year, increases the probability of a crisis in the
subsequent year. Second, a larger deviation of the real exchange rate from
trend in a given year increases the probability of crisis in the subsequent
year. The magnitudes involved are large.
Tables 1 to 3 present the results of a number of estimates using three
scaling variables for reserves. Tables 1 and 2 present the results from using
short-term debt from diﬀerent sources (BIS and WDI database), while table
3 uses total external debt.7 Although usually short-term debt has been used
as the scaling variable for reserves in models of crisis, in circumstances of
ﬁnancial stress, a liquidation of assets held by investors (both local and for-
eign) need not be constrained to their holdings of short term external debt.
7The main diﬀerence between the data on short-term debt from the BIS with respect
to that of the World Bank is that the ﬁrst comprises not only debt with maturity of up to
one year but also amortizations due within the year. Unfortunately, this database starts
during the 90s and it is available only for emerging economies.
6Domestic agents can liquidate their own holdings of money (a Central Bank
liability) while holders of external debt can attempt to shift their portfolio
away from all external liabilities. This justiﬁes trying other deﬁnitions of
the relevant scaling variables for reserves.
In Table 1 the coeﬃcient of reserves to short term debt are statistically
signiﬁcant at 10% in all speciﬁc a t i o n s ,w h i l ei nt a b l e2t h i si ss oi n1 9o u t
of 26 cases. In table 3 (using total external debt) 16 speciﬁcations lead to
a statistically signiﬁcant estimate for the eﬀect of reserves over total debt.
Moreover, in essentially all the speciﬁcations in Tables 1 to 3 the exchange
rate deviation from trend is related statistically to the probability of crisis.
We expanded these basic estimates with a number of other variables
that have been included in the literature. The eﬀect of the inclusion of
these variables as well as their estimated incidence is discussed in turn in
what follows.
• The eﬀect of diﬀerent measures of liabilities
Including as an additional explanatory variable the total stock of external
debt, as percentage of GDP, does not aﬀect either the size or signiﬁcance
of the eﬀect of the ratio of reserves to short term debt and exchange rate
deviations from trend, in Tables 1 through 3. It does not either appear to
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the probability of crisis.
In Table 3, the inclusion of the structure of external debt does not either
have a signiﬁcant incidence. However, if the ratio of reserves to total debt
is instead used, the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient is an order of
magnitude larger than the one that accompanies in previous speciﬁcations
the ratio of reserves to short term debt.
This result must be interpreted with caution, as it is a product of the
scaling of the variables and not a marginal contribution to the crisis proba-
bility. When incorporating additionally the structure of external debt, the
ratio between short term to long term debt appears to increase the crisis
probability but not with a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.
• Economic growth and credit booms
Economic growth, both measured as aggregate GDP growth and export
growth, appears to strongly inﬂuence in the expected way the probability of
crisis.
This can stem from a number of reasons. A quicker pace of economic
growth can provide for a lower demand of publicly provided assistance pro-
grams and allow for increased tax revenue over the cycle, while faster export
7growth, given domestic demand growth, reduces the current account deﬁcit.
Including both export growth and GDP growth indicates that the latter is
the most signiﬁcantly related to crisis probability.
Domestic credit expansion, on the other hand, does have a positive im-
pact on crisis probability. However, it is not statistically signiﬁcant at con-
ventional levels.
• External conditions
In principle one should expect that crises are more likely whenever ex-
ternal conditions deteriorate. Declining terms of trade, higher international
interest rates, and the interaction of the latter with the outstanding stock
of external debt should make for diﬃcult circumstances.
However, the results from our estimations are mixed. When controlling
for the ratio of reserves to short term debt as well as the deviation of the
real exchange rate from trend, the eﬀect of the terms of trade on crisis
probability is far from being clear cut. In several exploratory speciﬁcations
(not reported) actually the eﬀect of positive terms of trade shocks —identiﬁed
either by the change over previous periods or the deviation from an HP
trend— seems to increase the probability of a crisis. Moreover, another result
that is somewhat striking is the lack of a statistical signiﬁcant direct relation
between changes in international interest rates —proxied here by the TBILL
rate— and crisis probability.
These odd results, if they stand closer scrutiny, could result from cor-
relations with our main variables that relate to the crisis probability: the
ratio of reserves to short term debt as w e l la st h ee x c h a n g er a t ed e v i a t i o n s
from trend. On the one hand, a fall in the terms of trade or an increase
in international interest rates could inﬂuence crisis probability through the
impact it has on reserve policy. Evidence on this front is suggestive.8
The interaction term between international interest rates and the stock
of total external debt, a usual measure of the ﬁnancial burden of external
debt, is statistically related to crisis probability only in one speciﬁcation.
• Exchange rate regime
8Garcia (1999) ﬁnds that, in contrast to the predictions of standard models of re-
serve demand, the correlation between reserves an international interest rates is negative
for emerging economies. Exploring regressions that include the ratio of short-term debt
lead to a positive but slightly signiﬁcant eﬀect of the international interest rate on crisis
probability.
8In a trivial way the stock of reserves is related to the exchange rate
regime: a ﬁxed exchange rate regime should lead to a close relationship be-
tween the adjustment of the money market and the movements in reserves,
while in a ﬂoating exchange rate regime reserves should move more inde-
pendently of monetary developments. A more diﬃcult question is whether
countries with a particular exchange rate regime would choose to hoard on
average more or less reserves. This is linked to how sensitive is a particular
exchange rate regime to crises. To assess this latter issue, we include as
an additional regressor in our crisis probability speciﬁcations a measure of
the exchange rate regime. We use Reinhard and Rogoﬀ’s (2002) measure of
exchange rate regime, extrapolated for the period 2000 to 2002. To prevent
the simultaneity problem that would arise from including the contempora-
neous exchange rate regime and the ocurrence of a crisis, we lag the regime
variable by two years. The results obtained are on Tables 1 to 3. We ﬁnd
that the exchange rate regime is in fact related to crisis probability. The
results are robust to a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations and measures of
reserves, and they show that, compared to the baseline of a hard peg, ﬁxed
regimes are more prone to crisis. Flexible regimes, on the other hand, are
not particularly less prone to crisis, as it could be expected.
Hence, our results show that the worst choice, in terms of external vul-
nerability, is a weak commitment to a ﬁxed exchange rate. This result
is consistent with the commonly held view that economies have tended to
abandon intermediate regimes for either full ﬂoating or hard pegs (Fischer,
2003).
3.3 Diﬀerent measures of crises
In related literature, an alternative variable usually chosen to indicate the
ocurrence of a crisis is a large current account reversal. We estimated similar
speciﬁcations as the ones presented before including, instead of the exchange
rate market pressure variable, the ocurrence of a large (more than 4%) swing
in the current account. Baseline results are presented in Tables 4 to 6. The
scaled reserve variable remains in all cases statistically signiﬁcant, while the
real exchange rate misalignment is still strongly related to this measure of
crisis. The speciﬁcations that include the exchange rate regime variable still
have the same implications for the ﬁxed regimes as the previous results,
but are statistically signiﬁcant in only a few cases. However, now ﬂexible
exchange rate regimes seem to reduce the likelihood of crises, though not
in a statistically signiﬁcant way. Interestingly, a variable that appears in
this case strongly related to the current account reversal is a measure of
9openness of the economy.
3.4 Financial development, political variables and crisis prob-
ability
One of the hypothesis we aim to explore in this paper is that the probability
of a crisis may be aﬀected by the incidence of institutional aspects. In
particular we are interested in evaluating the incidence of ﬁnancial market
development on crisis, and the role of political institutions in determining
the vulnerability of countries to external shocks.
We expect that more developed ﬁnancial systems should allow for a lower
need for reserves to stave oﬀ crises. A deeper or better functioning ﬁnan-
cial system should allow to funnel domestic resources to prevent the costly
adjustments in the face of crises. At the same time, we expect that better
political institutions, in the sense of being more transparent and account-
able, reduce the likelihood of “crony capitalism”, allow market participants
to see economic policy measures as credible, and are themselves better suited
to face in a prompt and eﬃcient manner ﬁnancial turbulences.9 The empir-
ical problem with this is that it is inherently diﬃcult to select a particular
variable that summarizes the implication of political institutions on the vul-
nerability of a country. Therefore, we draw from other work and use an
index of institutional development, constructed as the ﬁrst principal compo-
nent of four indicators: Prevalence of law and order, quality of bureaucracy,
absence of corruption, accountability of public oﬃcials.10 We denominate
this index Governance. We also use some of the indicators individually.
To analyze the implications of ﬁnancial development on crisis probability
of we use the database on ﬁnancial system indicators presented by Demirgüc-
Kunt and Levine (2001), from which we select four indicators. Two are
intended to reﬂect the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial sector, and two capture the
size of the ﬁnancial market.
With respect to the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial sector, we expect that a
more eﬃcient ﬁnancial system reduces the probability of crisis by increas-
ing the informational content of price signals and therefore allowing for a
smoother adjustment by the private sector. The variables selected are the
net interest margin and the stock market turnover. The net interest mar-
9Aizenman and Marion (2004) show that the quality of political institution may aﬀect
the optimal level of reserves holdings.
10We are thankful to Cesar Calderon for providing us with this dataset. The original
source is Political and Risk Services (PRS) Group. International Country Risk Guide.
Various Issues.
10gin is measured as the accounting value of bank’s net interest revenues as
a share of total assets. A lower reliance on this type of income reﬂects
narrower spreads between lending and borrowing rates, and therefore, is in-
dicative of a more competitive banking system, a ﬁnancial market where the
informational asymmetries are smaller, or a ﬁnancial market where the het-
erogeneity of agents with respect to their idiosyncratic risk is more muted.
Meanwhile, a bigger stock market turnover is indicative of lower transaction
costs or a larger degree of liquidity is stocks.
A larger ﬁnancial sector, in turn, should allow the ﬁscal or monetary au-
thorities to tap the required resources to stave oﬀ liquidity shocks, instead
of having to draw international reserves. The variables selected are total
private credit by banks and similar institutions, and stock market capital-
ization.
Tables 7 and 8 summarize the eﬀects of including the ﬁnancial system
variables and Governance, both individually and with an interaction term,
in the three benchmark set of estimates (one for each scaling variable for
reserves). Both, ﬁnancial and political variables are lagged two years to
mitigate simultaneity bias. Panel a in both tables reports the median of the
coeﬃcient of the benchmark variables and the number of times the respective
variable is statistically signiﬁcan out of the total number of speciﬁcations
(in brakets). Panel b reports the coeﬃcient of each of the institutional
variables included in diﬀerent speciﬁcations (note that they do not enter
simultaneously, except for the interaction term).
It is noteworthy that the main results highlighted in the previous section
still stand out. Economic growth, real exchange rate misalignment and the
ratio of reserves to the diﬀerent scaling variables are all statistically related
to the crisis probability.
The eﬀect of the ﬁnancial and political system variables is much less clear
cut, which is rather surprising. When included individually governance vari-
ables —both the aggregate measure and two single indicators: prevalence of
law and order and absence of corruption— are far from statistical signiﬁ-
cance, except for corruption that seems to increase the crisis probability
(Table 7).11
Financial system variables too are far from having a statistically signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on crisis probability when included alone, except for the case of
net interest margin, which has a negative eﬀect on crisis probability. Inter-
action terms improve only slightly the results. The speciﬁcations that ﬁt
11A higher value for the index indicates a better quality of institution. Therefore, the
higher the corruption index is, the lower the corruption.
11our hypothesis better are the ones in columns 2, 5 and 8 in Table 8. The
results indicate that better public institutions, measured by the governance
variable, reduce the probability of crisis, but that this eﬀect is bigger for
economies with small ﬁnancial systems, measured by the amount of private
credit or the ﬁnancial capitalization. These two variables alone seem to
actually increase the probability of crisis. Finally, our results show that a
larger net interest margin increases the probability of crises but only for high
values of the governance variable, which is by itself negatively, although not
statistically, related to this probability.
The previous speciﬁcations attempted to detect whether institutional
variables per-se aﬀected crises probability. One alternative approach is that
institutional variables are substitutes to reserves in determining the likeli-
hood of crises. If this was the case, one should expect that the marginal
contribution of the stock of reserves to crisis probability is dependent on
the degree of institutional development. The bottom part in Tables 7 and 8
present speciﬁcations where the reserves variable has been interacted with
the institutional measures. The results are again not conclusive and only in
a few cases statistically signiﬁcant. These results, along with the preivously
reported, are not clear and unambigous enough to make a strong case that
institutional variables reduce the likelihood of crises once one controls for
reserve accumulation and real exchange rate misalignment. Of course, it can
be the case that good institutions limit the probability of crises indirectly
through the choice of exchange rate regime, as well as reserve policy and
exchange rate policy.
As a conclusion, political and ﬁnancial variables are far from being
strongly related to crisis probabilities. The eﬀects are not always statis-
tically signiﬁcant, and the signs are often opposite to our priors. In contrast
to this, the results of the benchmark estimates remain. The ratio of short
term debt to several measures of liabilities, the rate of growth and exchange
rate misalignment are all still strong determinants of crisis probability.
4 An assessment of recent trends in reserve accu-
mulation
In the context of the recent debate on reserves accumulation by some East
Asian economies it has been argued that, while reserves may be useful as a
tool to avoid crisis, there is a limit for level of reserves needed to actually
prevent a ﬁnancial crisis. It has been argued that a ratio of reserves to STD
above one would reduce considerably the crisis vulnerability of a country
12but a ratio much above one would do nothing to reduce the risk of a crisis
(see for example IMF, 2003). While theoretical arguments can be made to
justify such an assertion, there is no systematic quantitative evaluation of
the contribution of reserves to reduce the crisis vulnerability.
In this section we take at face value our estimates of crisis probability
from the previous sections to evaluate recent trends in reserves accumula-
tion by some East Asian emerging economies and for Chile. Importantly,
our model for crisis probability encompass non-linear eﬀects of liquidity mea-
sures. While these non-linear eﬀect may not be enough to capture a pos-
sible threshold level for the reserves to short-term debt ratio —above which
its marginal contribution to reduce the risk of a crisis is nil— at least the
quantitative magnitude arise from empirical estimates.
We perform two types of exercises. First, we determine the optimal level
of the reserves for each country under diﬀerent assumptions about the cost
of a crisis. Second, we establish the implicit cost of a crisis that underlies
actual holdings of reserves under the assumption that the level of reserves
is determined in each countries optimally through a cost-beneﬁta n a l y s i s . 12
To determine the optimal level of reserves we follow closely the cost-
beneﬁt analysis of Ben Bassat and Gottlieb (1992). Consider the problem of
a Central Bank that decides the amount of reserves it will carry over period
t by minimizing an expected loss function that considers both the eﬀects of
reserve accumulation in terms of reducing the expected cost of a crisis, and
the opportunity cost of reserves.13
We assume the loss function for the authority takes the following form:
Λt = ptCt +( 1− pt)ρtRt (6)
where pt is the probability of a crisis, which depends on the reserves to
short-term debt ratio and which is given by expression (5), Ct is the cost
of a crisis, Rt is the level of reserves and ρt is the unit cost of reserves.
The authority decides period by period the optimal amount of reserves by
minimizing (6) subject to
Kt − Wt + Rt = Dt (7)
12Usually the optimal or adequate level of reserves for a country has been determined
either by estimating a demand for reserves model (Aizenman and Marion 2003; Flood and
Marion, 2001), or by using simple adequacy indicators (Wijnholds and Kaptyen, 2001).
Recently Lee (2004) has developed an alternative options-based approach to establish the
optimal amount of reserves.
13It has been shown by De Gregorio and Lee (2004) and Park and Lee (2002) among
others that real output growth follows typically a V pattern over the period before and
after a crisis. However, the post-crisis growth rate for those countries do not exceed the
pre-crisis period average. That means that a crises entail a permanent output loss.
13where Kt is the capital stock of the economy, Wt is total wealth, and Dt =
St + LTDt is the total debt of the country composed by short-term debt,
St, and medium and long term debt, LTDt. We assume that short-term
debt is predetermined and any change in reserves is ﬁnanced with medium
and long term borrowing. This assumption is important in order to have
an interior solutions for the optimal amount of reserves. To understand
this point suppose reserves are completely ﬁnanced with short-term debt.
That means that any change is reserves conveys a one-to-one change in short
term debt, and the ratio between these two variables is never modiﬁed. This
implies that the authority can not aﬀect the probability of crisis by adjusting
reserves. Since carrying reserves is costly and reports no beneﬁt then the
optimal amount would tend to be zero.
We assume that reserves not only aﬀect the probability of a crisis but also
the cost of crises. Depending on how reserves are utilized, and in cases where
a crisis has its origins in a liquidity shock, larger amounts of international
reserves could imply that countries avoid costly liquidation of assets. This,
in turn, would reduce the impact of the shock on domestic output. De
Gregorio and Lee (2004), for example, ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
of liquidity —measured as reserves relative to either domestic liabilities (M2)
or short term debt– to reduce the cost of a BoP crisis.14
In our case, we assume that the cost of a crisis —as a fraction of GDP— is















+( 1− pt)ρt − pR,tρtRt =0 , (8)
where the partial derivative of the crisis probability with respect to R is









Notice that we have assumed that the opportunity cost of reserves is
independent from the reserves to short-term debt ratio. In theory, this op-
portunity cost corresponds to the diﬀerence between the marginal produc-
tivity of capital in the economy and the yield on reserves –which is typically
14De Gregorio and Lee (2004) also ﬁnd that ﬁnancial soundness, real exchange rate de-
preciation and the monetary policy play a critical role in reducing output losses associated
with BoP crises.
14lower than then productivity of capital. In our empirical application below
we take as a proxy for this opportunity cost the sovereign spread of each
country in our sample. These sovereign spreads depend, among other things,
on the perceived risk of each country and, therefore, could be aﬀected their
international liquidity. However, empirical estimations of the determinants
of sovereign spread for emerging economies show that the eﬀect of reserves
is negligible and in many cases statistically not signiﬁcant. Moreover, some
recent empirical studies for emerging markets show that short-run move-
ments in spreads are explained by changes in market conditions rather than
fundamentals (Naudon, 2004). By not considering possible eﬀects of re-
serves on spreads our results would tend to underestimate the optimal level
of reserves.
Combining the previous two expressions we obtain the following non-





















+( 1− pt)ρt (9)
where η = ∂C
∂(Rt/St) corresponds to the change in the cost of a crisis associated
with an change in the reserves to short-term debt ratio.
4.1 Optimal level of reserves for selected economies
We compute the optimal level of reserves derived from equation (9) for four
Asian economies: China, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, and for Chile. As a
proxy of the opportunity cost we take data on sovereign spreads from EMBI
global. We utilize two of our benchmark estimates of crisis probability from
the previous section: One that utilizes BIS data to construct the reserves
to short-term debt ratio (speciﬁcation 7, Table 1), and another that utilizes
WB data (speciﬁcation 7 in Table 2). Finally, we assume that η = −0.0025
which is the value estimated by De Gregorio and Lee (2004) for the marginal
eﬀect of the reserves to short-term debt ratio on the cost of a crisis.
Table 9 presents the estimates of the optimal level of reserves for three
possible crisis cost: 5% GDP, 10% GDP and 15% GDP. These ﬁgures corre-
spond roughly to the cost of three diﬀerent types of crisis according to the
estimates in IMF (1998): A currency crisis, a currency crash, and a banking
crisis.15
15According the ﬁgures reported by the IMF (1998), the average cost of a currency
15From the results based on the BIS data we conclude that the amount of
reserves held by Malaysia, Thailand and Korea by 2003 is not above what
would be optimal for those countries.16 For these three countries, even if the
cost of a crisis is low, the amount of reserves being held would be justiﬁed.
In fact, for mild cost of crisis the optimal amount of reserves could be up to
100% above what is actually being held.
If we consider the results based on the WB data, however, then the
amount of reserves held by Thailand and Korea would be roughly consistent
with the optimal amount for a mild crisis. On the contrary, for Malaysia
there would be a clear excess of reserves.
In the case of China, no matter how strong is the crisis, actual reserves
w o u l db ea tl e a s tt w i c ea sm u c ha si tw o u l db eo p t i m a lw i t ht h eB I Se s -
timates. Using these estimates the optimal level of reserves during 2003
should be approximately 12.3 % of GDP if we consider a crisis cost of 15%
of GDP. This number is 85% less than the amount of reserves being hold
currently by China. Now, if we consider the WB estimates then China’s
reserves would be consistent with a cost of a crisis that ranges from mild to
strong.
In the case of Chile, actual reserves are systematically above its optimal
level except in the case of the optimal level based on BIS data, but only for
the last 3 years and when the cost of a crisis is 15% of GDP. For moderate
cost (10% of GDP) reserves are above its optimal level between 40% and
100%.
4.2 Implicit cost of crisis
An alternative way of evaluating reserves consist in determining what is the
implicit cost of a crisis that is behind the actual level being hold. In Table 10
we present such estimates assuming that this level of reserves is determined
optimally according to equation (9).
The implicit cost of a crisis ranges from 4.9 to 11.6% of GDP in the case
of Thailand and 2.9 to 6.6% GDP for Korea. In order words, the level of
reserves of these two countries is consistent with a soft to mild crisis. In the
case of Malaysia, the implicit cost of a crisis could be very low if we utilize
crisis, a currency crash, and a banking crisis in emerging markets —in terms of loss of
output relative to trend— is approximately 7.6% of GDP, 10.7% of GDP, and 14.0% of
GDP, respectively.
16Optimal level of reserves for the years 2000 and 2001 for these three countries are not
well deﬁned because the crisis probability those years is polluted by the recovery period
after the Asian crisis.
16the estimates using BIS data (2.8%), or relatively high, if we consider WB
data (21.7%). Therefore, our conclusion with respect to the adequacy of
reserves for this country are more mixed.
The cost of a crisis that is implicit in the level of reserves hold by China is
extremely high when considering the estimate based on BIS data. According
to our calculation, the cost of a crisis that would justify the amount of
reserves held should be approximately 150% GDP, clearly larger than any
actual crisis. Under the estimates based on WB data, the implicit cost of a
crisis is consistent with a mild crisis (approximately 11% of GDP).
To understand why the level of reserves hold by countries such as Thai-
land and Korea does not seem to be above what should be the optimal for
those countries, it is necessary to consider both the cost of holding reserves
and the probability of a crisis. For these two countries, the estimated prob-
ability of a crisis in the last two years was not extremely high (2.5% - 5% in
the case of Thailand, and 2.6% - 5.9% in the case of Korea) but much larger
than the crisis probability of countries like China (between 0% and 1%). At
the same time the cost of carrying reserves for these two economies has been
very low (around 100 basis points over the last two years). Therefore, the
cost beneﬁt analysis that is implicit in equation (9) implies that the optimal
level of reserves should be relatively high.
The clear excess of reserves in the case of China with the BIS data is due
to the fact that the crisis probability is very low. In fact, the cost of reserves
for China is the lowest for all the countries in our sample (less than 100
basis points the last two years). In other words, the excess of reserves for
this country is not due to the high cost of carrying reserves but is explained
by the low beneﬁts of them. Notice that the low spread in the case of China
reﬂects in part the low risk of a crisis for this country.
Finally, the implicit cost of a crisis in the case of Chile corresponds to
the cost of a mild to severe crisis. However, this implicit cost is much lower
that the cost of the Chilean crisis in at the beginning of the 80’s which was
in the range of 20% to 40% of GDP approximately.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
It has been argued that reserve accumulation allows to reduce the likelihood
of self-fulﬁlling speculative attacks. Also, it has been stressed that reserve
accumulation is a relatively costly self-insurance strategy, and it can be
actually counterproductive. Large reserves stocks may create moral hazard
problems that could weaken the ﬁnancial system of a country. This, in turn,
17could make crises to be deeper in those economies.
In this paper we estimate the impact of reserves on the probability of
a crisis. Our goal is to evaluate how robust are reserves —or the lack of
them— in explaining crisis after controlling for set of indicators, including the
quality of political institutions and the soundness of the ﬁnancial system.
The empirical evidence we present indicates that the probability of crisis is
still strongly related to this ratio of reserves to short-term debt even when
controlling for institutional variables.
We then utilize our estimates of crisis probabilities to evaluate the opti-
mal level of reserves from a cost-beneﬁt analysis for a selected group of East
Asian economies and for Chile. In this exercise we show that the actual size
of the reserve stock observed today in some of those countries is not far from
what would be implied by the usual cost of crises. Our results lead us to the
conclusion that recent trends in reserve accumulation by Asian economies
could be a sensible approach in dealing with the current macroeconomic
conditions in the world economy.
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23Table 1: Benchmark Estimation of Crisis Probability. Liquidity Measure: Reserves to Short Term Debt from BIS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
REER MIS -5.389 -5.638 -9.107 -8.91 -5.458 -5.763 -9.159 -8.97 -9.369 -9.067 -5.525 -5.787 -9.348
(3.88)** (3.89)** (4.69)** (4.65)** (3.82)** (3.84)** (4.56)** (4.44)** (4.71)** (4.66)** (3.84)** (3.84)** (4.59)**
OPEN 1.584 2.603 3.192 3.592 2.148 3.317 3.461 4.015 3.287 3.711 2.116 3.324 3.504
(0.90) (1.55) (1.77)* (2.03)* (1.18) (1.88)* (1.89)* (2.21)* (1.81)* (2.07)* (1.16) (1.89)* (1.91)*
R/STD -0.391 -0.438 -0.504 -0.573 -0.468 -0.55 -0.529 -0.62 -0.537 -0.592 -0.476 -0.552 -0.551
(1.90)* (1.88)* (2.01)* (1.97)* (2.07)* (2.11)* (2.07)* (2.04)* (2.06)* (1.98)* (2.09)* (2.11)* (2.10)*
TD/GDP -0.336 -1.609 -0.416 -1.57 -1.557 -0.39 -1.52
(0.42) (1.91)* (0.52) (1.89)* (1.81)* (0.48) (1.80)*
CRED 0.313 0.318 0.512 0.528 0.438 0.478 0.572 0.611 0.528 0.548 0.445 0.482 0.579
(1.08) (1.08) (1.24) (1.26) (1.42) (1.50) (1.34) (1.39) (1.30) (1.32) (1.45) (1.51) (1.37)
PUB. DEBT -1.206 -2.153 -1.32 -2.102 -2.128 -1.316
(1.22) (2.21)* (1.31) (2.18)* (2.14)* (1.31)
Growth -14.83 -13.593 -14.332 -12.858 -15.237 -13.982 -14.697
(4.07)** (3.85)** (3.86)** (3.55)** (4.12)** (3.89)** (3.90)**
Exports -3.17 -3.885 -1.915 -2.583 -3.106 -3.806 -1.686
(1.69)* (1.97)* (0.98) (1.25) (1.65)* (1.92)* (0.85)
TBILL -0.202 -0.22 -0.096 -0.08 -0.172
(0.96) (0.85) (0.49) (0.34) (0.80)
∆TBILL
TBILL*TD/GDP
FIX 1.688 0.928 2.348 1.595 1.767 1.029 2.299 1.54 2.39 1.607 1.807 1.04 2.356
(1.69)* (0.85) (2.23)* (1.39) (1.74)* (0.93) (2.21)* (1.35) (2.27)* (1.39) (1.77)* (0.94) (2.25)*
MANAGED 0.737 0.557 0.888 0.792 0.697 0.534 0.761 0.656 0.979 0.862 0.748 0.567 0.866
(0.90) (0.68) (1.06) (0.94) (0.84) (0.65) (0.91) (0.78) (1.16) (1.01) (0.90) (0.68) (1.02)
FLOAT 0.828 0.78 0.829 0.783 0.791 0.736 0.778 0.736 0.835 0.775 0.818 0.757 0.804
(0.99) (0.93) (0.94) (0.88) (0.94) (0.87) (0.89) (0.84) (0.95) (0.87) (0.97) (0.89) (0.92)
Constant -3.946 -3.771 -3.436 -3.445 -3.799 -3.626 -3.34 -3.348 -2.586 -2.465 -3.4 -3.281 -2.642
(4.25)** (4.17)** (3.71)** (3.78)** (4.02)** (3.91)** (3.60)** (3.64)** (2.05)* (1.72)* (2.75)** (2.41)* (2.10)*
Observations 512 480 511 479 506 474 505 473 511 479 506 474 505
pseudo R2 0.13 0.14 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.17 0.24
N crisis 24 23 24 23 24 23 24 23 24 23 24 23 24
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
2
4Table 1 (concluded)
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
REER MIS -9.039 -10.015 -9.736 -5.589 -5.861 -10.001 -9.701 -9.233 -8.823 -5.449 -5.621 -9.242 -8.842
(4.46)** (4.83)** (4.77)** (3.90)** (3.90)** (4.74)** (4.61)** (4.68)** (4.55)** (3.81)** (3.75)** (4.55)** (4.34)**
OPEN 4.056 3.568 4.05 2.213 3.423 3.734 4.322 3.234 3.484 2.154 2.966 3.485 3.86
(2.23)* (1.93)* (2.23)* (1.21) (1.94)* (2.01)* (2.34)* (1.78)* (1.91)* (1.18) (1.66)* (1.90)* (2.08)*
R/STD -0.629 -0.556 -0.62 -0.468 -0.548 -0.571 -0.656 -0.518 -0.562 -0.467 -0.504 -0.537 -0.605
(2.04)* (2.11)* (2.01)* (2.07)* (2.09)* (2.15)* (2.06)* (2.03)* (1.91)* (2.06)* (1.92)* (2.08)* (1.98)*
TD/GDP -1.609 -0.398 -1.572 -0.802 -0.545 -0.974
(1.86)* (0.50) (1.85)* (0.42) (0.31) (0.51)
CRED 0.617 0.619 0.638 0.454 0.489 0.652 0.683 0.521 0.53 0.437 0.498 0.577 0.618
(1.42) (1.38) (1.40) (1.48) (1.54) (1.43) (1.47) (1.27) (1.26) (1.41) (1.54) (1.36) (1.40)
PUB. DEBT -2.077 -2.229 -1.324 -2.163 -2.539 -3.154 -2.718
(2.12)* (2.22)* (1.32) (2.19)* (1.37) (1.72)* (1.47)
Growth -13.139 -15.809 -14.582 -15.48 -14.046 -15.026 -13.374 -14.497 -12.478
(3.57)** (4.26)** (4.02)** (4.12)** (3.79)** (4.08)** (3.68)** (3.86)** (3.35)**
Exports -2.325 -2.787 -3.506 -1.269 -1.802 -3.182 -4.118 -1.842 -2.696
(1.10) (1.44) (1.71)* (0.65) (0.87) (1.69)* (2.04)* (0.94) (1.28)
TBILL -0.156
(0.59)
∆TBILL -0.419 -0.423 -0.168 -0.153 -0.394 -0.381
(1.93)* (1.90)* (0.82) (0.71) (1.78)* (1.66)*
TBILL*TD/GDP -0.154 0.069 0.025 0.32 -0.112 0.108
(0.46) (0.25) (0.08) (1.29) (0.34) (0.40)
FIX 1.563 2.579 1.805 1.847 1.076 2.53 1.74 2.368 1.562 1.762 0.968 2.324 1.486
(1.36) (2.38)* (1.52) (1.80)* (0.97) (2.35)* (1.48) (2.25)* (1.35) (1.74)* (0.85) (2.22)* (1.29)
MANAGED 0.731 1.066 0.955 0.765 0.585 0.959 0.833 0.917 0.794 0.692 0.617 0.793 0.654
(0.86) (1.24) (1.10) (0.92) (0.70) (1.11) (0.96) (1.09) (0.94) (0.84) (0.74) (0.94) (0.78)
FLOAT 0.749 0.93 0.864 0.828 0.762 0.894 0.829 0.804 0.798 0.791 0.839 0.768 0.76
(0.85) (1.04) (0.96) (0.98) (0.90) (1.00) (0.93) (0.91) (0.90) (0.94) (0.98) (0.88) (0.87)
Constant -2.676 -3.877 -3.848 -3.993 -3.787 -3.786 -3.737 -3.49 -3.471 -3.791 -3.794 -3.395 -3.38
(1.85)* (3.85)** (3.89)** (4.04)** (3.91)** (3.74)** (3.75)** (3.70)** (3.79)** (4.00)** (3.97)** (3.58)** (3.67)**
Observations 473 511 479 506 474 505 473 511 479 506 474 505 473
pseudo R2 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.15 0.17 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.17 0.24 0.25
N crisis 23 24 23 24 23 24 23 24 23 24 23 24 23
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
2
5Table 2: Benchmark Estimation of Crisis Probability. Liquidity Measure: Reserves to Short Term Debt from WB.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
REER MIS -5.09 -5.095 -5.686 -5.722 -5.104 -5.101 -5.662 -5.684 -5.617 -5.673 -5.017 -5.025 -5.618
(5.99)** (5.98)** (6.12)** (6.12)** (5.84)** (5.82)** (6.02)** (6.01)** (6.00)** (6.02)** (5.73)** (5.72)** (5.93)**
OPEN 0.278 0.639 0.026 0.287 0.427 0.757 0.107 0.35 -0.044 0.244 0.295 0.655 0.055
(0.21) (0.48) (0.02) (0.21) (0.31) (0.57) (0.08) (0.26) (0.03) (0.18) (0.21) (0.48) (0.04)
R/STD -0.267 -0.291 -0.245 -0.257 -0.271 -0.291 -0.245 -0.256 -0.229 -0.246 -0.243 -0.269 -0.235
(1.89)* (2.03)* (1.78)* (1.84)* (1.91)* (2.03)* (1.76)* (1.82)* (1.64) (1.74)* (1.71)* (1.87)* (1.66)*
TD/GDP -0.013 -0.362 -0.01 -0.303 -0.295 0.082 -0.26
(0.02) (0.69) (0.02) (0.58) (0.54) (0.16) (0.48)
CRED 0.143 0.152 0.339 0.36 0.239 0.248 0.383 0.4 0.342 0.361 0.246 0.252 0.383
(0.55) (0.58) (1.24) (1.31) (0.90) (0.93) (1.39) (1.44) (1.25) (1.31) (0.94) (0.96) (1.39)
PUB. DEBT -0.499 -0.881 -0.464 -0.781 -0.826 -0.371
(0.77) (1.34) (0.72) (1.19) (1.22) (0.57)
Growth -5.918 -6.154 -5.368 -5.597 -5.714 -6.016 -5.247
(3.20)** (3.30)** (2.86)** (2.95)** (3.03)** (3.17)** (2.74)**
Exports -2.197 -2.183 -1.452 -1.379 -2.035 -2.044 -1.398
(2.10)* (2.10)* (1.36) (1.28) (1.94)* (1.95)* (1.30)
TBILL 0.031 0.021 0.049 0.041 0.02
(0.54) (0.37) (0.89) (0.74) (0.34)
∆TBILL
TBILL*TD/GDP
FIX 0.771 0.692 0.914 0.849 1.002 0.927 1.035 0.969 0.93 0.862 1.032 0.954 1.047
(1.21) (1.08) (1.43) (1.32) (1.54) (1.42) (1.59) (1.48) (1.45) (1.34) (1.58) (1.46) (1.61)
MANAGED -0.002 -0.014 -0.103 -0.1 0.048 0.033 -0.082 -0.083 -0.076 -0.083 0.09 0.066 -0.063
(0.00) (0.04) (0.25) (0.24) (0.12) (0.08) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.22) (0.16) (0.15)
FLOAT 0.513 0.531 0.286 0.306 0.524 0.538 0.309 0.327 0.327 0.334 0.583 0.584 0.337
(1.24) (1.28) (0.67) (0.71) (1.25) (1.29) (0.72) (0.76) (0.75) (0.77) (1.37) (1.38) (0.77)
Constant -3.133 -3.006 -2.608 -2.517 -3.137 -3.015 -2.657 -2.566 -2.885 -2.702 -3.557 -3.355 -2.835
(6.04)** (6.10)** (4.89)** (4.99)** (5.93)** (5.99)** (4.90)** (5.01)** (3.84)** (3.78)** (4.94)** (4.87)** (3.74)**
Observations 897 897 874 874 891 891 868 868 874 874 891 891 868
pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0.2 0.2 0.18 0.18 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.18 0.18 0.2
N crisis 55 55 54 54 55 55 54 54 54 54 55 55 54
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
2
6Table 2 (concluded)
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
REER MIS -5.66 -5.745 -5.785 -5.127 -5.132 -5.691 -5.72 -5.55 -5.555 -5.003 -5.001 -5.543 -5.53
(5.94)** (6.14)** (6.14)** (5.84)** (5.82)** (6.03)** (6.02)** (5.98)** (5.96)** (5.76)** (5.75)** (5.90)** (5.88)**
OPEN 0.325 0.097 0.367 0.465 0.806 0.15 0.403 -0.203 -0.101 0.088 0.199 -0.112 -0.019
(0.24) (0.07) (0.27) (0.34) (0.60) (0.11) (0.30) (0.15) (0.07) (0.06) (0.14) (0.08) (0.01)
R/STD -0.251 -0.251 -0.263 -0.273 -0.293 -0.248 -0.26 -0.208 -0.191 -0.217 -0.199 -0.213 -0.196
(1.75)* (1.80)* (1.86)* (1.92)* (2.04)* (1.77)* (1.83)* (1.53) (1.40) (1.57) (1.44) (1.54) (1.42)
TD/GDP -0.377 -0.024 -0.314 -1.038 -0.96 -0.883
(0.71) (0.05) (0.60) (1.33) (1.23) (1.14)
CRED 0.4 0.345 0.366 0.239 0.248 0.384 0.401 0.347 0.376 0.258 0.279 0.386 0.406
(1.44) (1.26) (1.33) (0.90) (0.94) (1.39) (1.44) (1.26) (1.35) (0.98) (1.06) (1.39) (1.45)
PUB. DEBT -0.754 -0.901 -0.487 -0.8 -1.849 -1.761 -1.66
(1.12) (1.36) (0.75) (1.22) (2.10)* (2.01)* (1.88)*
Growth -5.533 -5.87 -6.093 -5.368 -5.592 -5.373 -5.296 -4.923 -4.871
(2.87)** (3.17)** (3.27)** (2.86)** (2.95)** (2.83)** (2.76)** (2.56)* (2.51)*
Exports -1.349 -2.139 -2.111 -1.376 -1.294 -1.94 -1.823 -1.324 -1.173
(1.25) (2.00)* (1.99)* (1.26) (1.18) (1.85)* (1.73)* (1.23) (1.08)
TBILL 0.011
(0.19)
∆TBILL -0.06 -0.062 -0.026 -0.033 -0.033 -0.038
(0.61) (0.64) (0.27) (0.34) (0.34) (0.38)
TBILL*TD/GDP 0.127 0.162 0.17 0.206 0.109 0.146
(1.23) (1.72)* (1.72)* (2.28)* (1.05) (1.54)
FIX 0.975 0.921 0.853 0.997 0.919 1.029 0.96 0.985 0.954 1.109 1.069 1.098 1.061
(1.49) (1.43) (1.32) (1.53) (1.41) (1.58) (1.47) (1.53) (1.46) (1.68)* (1.60) (1.67)* (1.60)
MANAGED -0.073 -0.112 -0.11 0.041 0.024 -0.09 -0.092 -0.026 0.051 0.152 0.228 -0.011 0.061
(0.18) (0.27) (0.27) (0.10) (0.06) (0.22) (0.22) (0.06) (0.12) (0.36) (0.54) (0.03) (0.14)
FLOAT 0.341 0.275 0.295 0.519 0.531 0.302 0.319 0.404 0.51 0.654 0.764 0.414 0.517
(0.78) (0.64) (0.69) (1.24) (1.27) (0.70) (0.74) (0.91) (1.13) (1.52) (1.73)* (0.93) (1.14)
Constant -2.659 -2.615 -2.525 -3.137 -3.016 -2.658 -2.568 -2.777 -2.886 -3.31 -3.415 -2.803 -2.899
(3.69)** (4.90)** (5.01)** (5.93)** (6.00)** (4.91)** (5.02)** (4.95)** (5.08)** (6.01)** (6.15)** (4.93)** (5.04)**
Observations 868 874 874 891 891 868 868 874 874 891 891 868 868
pseudo R2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.18 0.18 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.2 0.21
N crisis 54 54 54 55 55 54 54 54 54 55 55 54 54
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
2
7Table 3: Benchmark Estimation of Crisis Probability. Liquidity Measure: Reserves to Total Debt from WB.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
REER MIS -4.6 -5.147 -7.277 -5.674 -4.551 -5.174 -7.231 -5.668 -7.612 -5.591 -4.629 -5.091 -7.557
(3.61)** (6.07)** (4.26)** (6.12)** (3.44)** (5.94)** (4.17)** (6.04)** (4.28)** (5.99)** (3.46)** (5.83)** (4.20)**
OPEN 0.985 0.565 1.178 -0.067 1.213 0.668 1.36 0.067 1.37 -0.082 1.217 0.616 1.547
(0.56) (0.43) (0.67) (0.05) (0.68) (0.51) (0.77) (0.05) (0.76) (0.06) (0.68) (0.47) (0.86)
R/TD -2.58 -3.15 -1.952 -2.476 -2.716 -3.228 -2.072 -2.592 -2.226 -2.33 -2.82 -3.023 -2.318
(1.45) (2.50)* (1.04) (1.97)* (1.49) (2.50)* (1.10) (2.01)* (1.16) (1.85)* (1.53) (2.34)* (1.20)
STD/TD 0.856 1.271 1.062 1.341 1.354 1.087 1.428
(BIS) (1.03) (1.46) (1.23) (1.50) (1.53) (1.25) (1.57)
CRED 0.329 0.125 0.49 0.307 0.428 0.214 0.53 0.349 0.51 0.314 0.435 0.223 0.545
(1.13) (0.48) (1.33) (1.12) (1.39) (0.82) (1.41) (1.27) (1.39) (1.14) (1.42) (0.85) (1.46)
STD/TD 1.857 1.977 1.75 1.803 1.82 1.559
(WB) (1.22) (1.30) (1.15) (1.18) (1.18) (1.01)
Growth -11.613 -5.291 -11.183 -4.765 -12.168 -5.109 -11.763
(3.65)** (2.91)** (3.48)** (2.59)** (3.71)** (2.78)** (3.54)**
Exports -2.471 -2.153 -1.427 -1.51 -2.416 -2.013 -1.299
(1.37) (2.05)* (0.76) (1.40) (1.33) (1.91)* (0.69)
TBILL -0.198 0.038 -0.098 0.046 -0.188
(1.00) (0.67) (0.52) (0.83) (0.94)
∆TBILL
TBILL*TD/GDP
FIX 2.236 0.977 2.731 1.099 2.319 1.247 2.691 1.254 2.775 1.09 2.351 1.236 2.743
(2.05)* (1.47) (2.39)* (1.66)* (2.08)* (1.83)* (2.35)* (1.85)* (2.42)* (1.65)* (2.11)* (1.81)* (2.39)*
MANAGED 1.251 0.108 1.489 0.02 1.264 0.159 1.399 0.041 1.575 0.036 1.305 0.182 1.486
(1.43) (0.26) (1.65)* (0.05) (1.42) (0.39) (1.56) (0.10) (1.74)* (0.09) (1.46) (0.44) (1.64)
FLOAT 1.153 0.602 1.078 0.39 1.16 0.612 1.052 0.413 1.059 0.433 1.173 0.659 1.038
(1.26) (1.45) (1.14) (0.91) (1.26) (1.46) (1.12) (0.96) (1.12) (0.99) (1.27) (1.55) (1.10)
Constant -4.478 -3.443 -4.656 -3.156 -4.448 -3.416 -4.566 -3.138 -3.822 -3.425 -4.023 -3.728 -3.792
(4.52)** (6.44)** (4.63)** (5.94)** (4.40)** (6.32)** (4.53)** (5.82)** (2.98)** (5.09)** (3.10)** (5.59)** (2.96)**
Observations 512 897 511 874 506 891 505 868 511 874 506 891 505
pseudo R2 0.12 0.17 0.2 0.2 0.13 0.18 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.13 0.19 0.2
N crisis 24 55 24 54 24 55 24 54 24 54 24 55 24
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
2
8Table 3 (concluded)
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
REER MIS -5.61 -8.012 -5.73 -4.709 -5.189 -7.971 -5.692 -8.868 -5.667 -4.813 -5.127 -8.829 -5.673
(5.94)** (4.45)** (6.13)** (3.54)** (5.93)** (4.38)** (6.04)** (4.53)** (6.05)** (3.51)** (5.89)** (4.46)** (5.98)**
OPEN 0.047 1.292 -0.026 1.31 0.683 1.456 0.09 3.854 -0.097 2.242 0.268 4.001 0.087
(0.03) (0.73) (0.02) (0.73) (0.52) (0.82) (0.07) (1.75)* (0.07) (1.09) (0.18) (1.83)* (0.06)
R/TD -2.488 -2.029 -2.493 -2.704 -3.225 -2.124 -2.593 -4.816 -2.439 -3.777 -2.772 -4.862 -2.615
(1.92)* (1.08) (1.97)* (1.50) (2.49)* (1.12) (2.01)* (2.03)* (1.72)* (1.78)* (1.92)* (2.05)* (1.79)*
STD/TD 1.398 1.1 1.448 1.195 0.997 1.247
(BIS) (1.58) (1.28) (1.60) (1.17) (1.10) (1.17)
CRED 0.351 0.595 0.313 0.45 0.214 0.611 0.349 0.533 0.307 0.428 0.225 0.571 0.349
(1.27) (1.51) (1.14) (1.47) (0.82) (1.54) (1.27) (1.30) (1.12) (1.39) (0.86) (1.35) (1.27)
STD/TD 1.704 2.02 1.765 1.828 1.978 1.77 1.802
(WB) (1.10) (1.33) (1.16) (1.20) (1.30) (1.16) (1.18)
Growth -4.654 -12.618 -5.26 -12.359 -4.771 -15.582 -5.258 -15.263 -4.785
(2.50)* (3.89)** (2.90)** (3.77)** (2.59)** (4.08)** (2.76)** (3.94)** (2.48)*
Exports -1.438 -2.119 -2.114 -0.904 -1.446 -2.502 -2.094 -1.281 -1.511
(1.33) (1.14) (1.97)* (0.48) (1.31) (1.37) (1.99)* (0.68) (1.40)
TBILL 0.026
(0.45)
∆TBILL -0.383 -0.055 -0.182 -0.017 -0.368 -0.026
(1.82)* (0.55) (0.89) (0.17) (1.73)* (0.26)
TBILL*TD/GDP -0.426 0.004 -0.187 0.047 -0.411 -0.003
(2.05)* (0.05) (0.99) (0.65) (2.02)* (0.03)
FIX 1.246 2.949 1.112 2.399 1.244 2.883 1.25 2.997 1.1 2.285 1.272 2.938 1.252
(1.84)* (2.51)* (1.68)* (2.14)* (1.83)* (2.46)* (1.84)* (2.62)** (1.66)* (2.09)* (1.86)* (2.58)** (1.85)*
MANAGED 0.053 1.669 0.016 1.322 0.155 1.561 0.035 1.368 0.023 1.131 0.196 1.247 0.039
(0.13) (1.81)* (0.04) (1.48) (0.38) (1.69)* (0.08) (1.57) (0.06) (1.29) (0.47) (1.43) (0.09)
FLOAT 0.443 1.201 0.382 1.19 0.609 1.15 0.408 0.987 0.394 1.065 0.639 0.909 0.411
(1.01) (1.25) (0.89) (1.28) (1.45) (1.20) (0.94) (1.09) (0.91) (1.18) (1.51) (1.00) (0.94)
Constant -3.322 -5.078 -3.178 -4.658 -3.423 -4.978 -3.149 -3.616 -3.174 -3.938 -3.594 -3.539 -3.127
(4.89)** (4.73)** (5.95)** (4.43)** (6.31)** (4.64)** (5.83)** (3.30)** (5.12)** (3.57)** (5.87)** (3.23)** (4.95)**
Observations 868 511 874 506 891 505 868 511 874 506 891 505 868
pseudo R2 0.2 0.21 0.2 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.2 0.23 0.2 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.2
N crisis 54 24 54 24 55 24 54 24 54 24 55 24 54
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
2
9Table 4: Benchmark Estimation of Crisis Probability (from CA). Liquidity Measure: Reserves to Short Term Debt from BIS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
REER MIS -3.013 -2.9 -2.841 -2.79 -2.625 -2.506 -2.41 -2.362 -2.869 -2.737 -2.693 -2.468 -2.426
(2.63)** (2.52)* (2.41)* (2.36)* (2.27)* (2.15)* (2.03)* (1.98)* (2.39)* (2.24)* (2.30)* (2.07)* (2.00)*
OPEN 4.222 4.311 4.173 4.293 4.261 4.347 4.204 4.329 4.197 4.407 4.293 4.441 4.218
(3.99)** (4.08)** (3.92)** (4.06)** (3.97)** (4.06)** (3.90)** (4.04)** (3.91)** (4.11)** (3.98)** (4.10)** (3.89)**
R/STD -0.458 -0.432 -0.456 -0.434 -0.463 -0.439 -0.459 -0.44 -0.49 -0.455 -0.493 -0.458 -0.488
(2.66)** (2.58)** (2.65)** (2.59)** (2.62)** (2.55)* (2.60)** (2.56)* (2.79)** (2.68)** (2.74)** (2.61)** (2.72)**
TD/GDP 0.539 0.601 0.474 0.549 0.656 0.52 0.601
(1.24) (1.34) (1.08) (1.21) (1.44) (1.17) (1.31)
CRED -3.091 -2.999 -3.223 -3.093 -2.662 -2.589 -2.806 -2.696 -3.341 -3.178 -2.766 -2.738 -2.939
(3.85)** (3.74)** (3.82)** (3.67)** (3.19)** (3.11)** (3.24)** (3.12)** (3.90)** (3.68)** (3.28)** (3.23)** (3.34)**
PUB. DEBT 0.664 0.704 0.572 0.618 0.758 0.63
(1.32) (1.37) (1.12) (1.19) (1.45) (1.21)
Growth 1.186 0.87 1.493 1.139 1.354 0.821 1.68
(0.58) (0.43) (0.72) (0.55) (0.64) (0.38) (0.79)
Exports -2.064 -1.937 -2.171 -2.018 -1.973 -1.637 -2.096
(1.58) (1.50) (1.64) (1.55) (1.49) (1.26) (1.57)
TBILL -0.205 -0.425 -0.185 -0.402 -0.188
(1.67)* (2.78)** (1.50) (2.62)** (1.53)
∆TBILL
TBILL*TD/GDP
FIX 0.774 0.668 0.764 0.656 0.799 0.667 0.786 0.65 0.873 0.712 0.9 0.71 0.888
(1.18) (1.01) (1.16) (1.00) (1.21) (1.00) (1.19) (0.98) (1.31) (1.07) (1.35) (1.06) (1.33)
MANAGED 0.237 0.105 0.237 0.096 0.183 0.049 0.181 0.037 0.347 0.19 0.281 0.136 0.281
(0.52) (0.23) (0.52) (0.21) (0.40) (0.11) (0.39) (0.08) (0.74) (0.41) (0.60) (0.29) (0.60)
FLOAT -0.512 -0.603 -0.502 -0.599 -0.623 -0.719 -0.616 -0.718 -0.458 -0.618 -0.593 -0.765 -0.58
(0.99) (1.17) (0.97) (1.16) (1.17) (1.35) (1.15) (1.35) (0.87) (1.17) (1.10) (1.41) (1.08)
Constant -3.315 -3.184 -3.384 -3.22 -3.148 -3.01 -3.229 -3.052 -2.528 -1.314 -2.375 -1.22 -2.449
(5.65)** (5.81)** (5.57)** (5.74)** (5.30)** (5.41)** (5.26)** (5.38)** (3.23)** (1.52) (3.07)** (1.42) (3.11)**
Observations 567 528 565 526 561 522 559 520 565 526 561 522 559
pseudo R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.15
N crisis 51 51 51 51 50 50 50 50 51 51 50 50 50
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
3
0Table 4 (concluded)
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
REER MIS -2.308 -2.816 -2.784 -2.577 -2.491 -2.333 -2.323 -2.913 -3.019 -2.723 -2.576 -2.464 -2.583
(1.87)* (2.39)* (2.36)* (2.21)* (2.13)* (1.95)* (1.94)* (2.39)* (2.41)* (2.32)* (2.14)* (2.01)* (2.05)*
OPEN 4.417 4.149 4.28 4.255 4.339 4.19 4.317 4.272 4.958 4.358 4.941 4.282 4.937
(4.07)** (3.89)** (4.04)** (3.96)** (4.05)** (3.88)** (4.03)** (3.96)** (4.43)** (4.02)** (4.40)** (3.93)** (4.38)**
R/STD -0.46 -0.45 -0.433 -0.456 -0.439 -0.452 -0.441 -0.496 -0.527 -0.499 -0.529 -0.494 -0.529
(2.62)** (2.61)** (2.59)** (2.59)** (2.55)* (2.57)* (2.56)* (2.82)** (3.01)** (2.77)** (2.93)** (2.75)** (2.93)**
TD/GDP 0.615 0.481 0.569 2.282 2.082 2.153
(1.37) (1.10) (1.25) (2.66)** (2.45)* (2.49)*
CRED -2.848 -3.278 -3.127 -2.666 -2.603 -2.833 -2.728 -3.277 -3.107 -2.722 -2.767 -2.88 -2.759
(3.22)** (3.84)** (3.68)** (3.15)** (3.10)** (3.23)** (3.13)** (3.83)** (3.63)** (3.24)** (3.27)** (3.28)** (3.15)**
PUB. DEBT 0.668 0.715 0.585 0.64 3.086 2.84 2.839
(1.26) (1.39) (1.15) (1.23) (3.15)** (2.91)** (2.90)**
Growth 1.102 1.278 0.926 1.718 1.31 1.174 -0.234 1.515 0.043
(0.50) (0.63) (0.45) (0.83) (0.63) (0.54) (0.10) (0.69) (0.02)
Exports -1.721 -2.348 -2.127 -2.503 -2.242 -2.044 -1.676 -2.146 -1.678
(1.31) (1.76)* (1.61) (1.85)* (1.67)* (1.54) (1.30) (1.61) (1.29)
TBILL -0.398
(2.60)**
∆TBILL 0.101 0.049 0.155 0.1 0.165 0.108
(0.76) (0.36) (1.11) (0.71) (1.17) (0.76)
TBILL*TD/GDP -0.347 -0.464 -0.33 -0.433 -0.331 -0.431
(2.22)* (2.75)** (2.13)* (2.62)** (2.11)* (2.58)**
FIX 0.696 0.723 0.645 0.754 0.655 0.74 0.639 0.921 0.755 0.957 0.734 0.938 0.723
(1.04) (1.10) (0.98) (1.14) (0.99) (1.11) (0.96) (1.38) (1.14) (1.42) (1.10) (1.39) (1.09)
MANAGED 0.126 0.214 0.091 0.155 0.042 0.155 0.032 0.391 0.02 0.331 -0.035 0.323 -0.045
(0.27) (0.47) (0.20) (0.34) (0.09) (0.34) (0.07) (0.83) (0.04) (0.70) (0.08) (0.68) (0.10)
FLOAT -0.752 -0.517 -0.602 -0.635 -0.718 -0.625 -0.715 -0.442 -0.772 -0.588 -0.899 -0.579 -0.906
(1.38) (1.00) (1.16) (1.19) (1.35) (1.17) (1.34) (0.84) (1.45) (1.09) (1.64) (1.07) (1.65)*
Constant -1.276 -3.343 -3.205 -3.072 -2.971 -3.165 -3.019 -3.535 -2.92 -3.304 -2.774 -3.371 -2.767
(1.47) (5.51)** (5.70)** (5.16)** (5.33)** (5.16)** (5.32)** (5.66)** (5.07)** (5.39)** (4.83)** (5.36)** (4.75)**
Observations 520 565 526 561 522 559 520 565 526 561 522 559 520
pseudo R2 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16
N crisis 50 51 51 50 50 50 50 51 51 50 50 50 50
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
3
1Table 5: Benchmark Estimation of Crisis Probability (from CA). Liquidity Measure: Reserves to Short Term Debt from WB.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
REER MIS -0.214 -0.194 -0.254 -0.248 -0.107 -0.091 -0.117 -0.11 -0.258 -0.251 -0.111 -0.095 -0.12
(0.36) (0.33) (0.43) (0.42) (0.18) (0.16) (0.20) (0.19) (0.44) (0.42) (0.19) (0.16) (0.20)
OPEN 2.76 2.835 2.736 2.799 2.971 3.042 2.971 3.038 2.735 2.8 2.969 3.041 2.97
(3.79)** (3.92)** (3.75)** (3.86)** (3.98)** (4.10)** (3.95)** (4.07)** (3.75)** (3.86)** (3.98)** (4.10)** (3.95)**
R/STD -0.153 -0.165 -0.152 -0.163 -0.141 -0.152 -0.142 -0.153 -0.144 -0.156 -0.138 -0.149 -0.139
(2.16)* (2.35)* (2.15)* (2.32)* (1.99)* (2.16)* (1.98)* (2.14)* (1.98)* (2.16)* (1.88)* (2.05)* (1.87)*
TD/GDP 0.619 0.581 0.562 0.576 0.612 0.572 0.589
(2.03)* (1.84)* (1.82)* (1.81)* (1.89)* (1.82)* (1.80)*
CRED -1.556 -1.569 -1.486 -1.478 -1.396 -1.41 -1.431 -1.425 -1.491 -1.482 -1.396 -1.41 -1.437
(3.10)** (3.13)** (2.81)** (2.80)** (2.72)** (2.75)** (2.65)** (2.65)** (2.82)** (2.81)** (2.72)** (2.75)** (2.66)**
PUB. DEBT 0.691 0.656 0.631 0.644 0.688 0.641
(1.93)* (1.80)* (1.74)* (1.75)* (1.85)* (1.74)*
Growth -0.491 -0.637 0.313 0.154 -0.387 -0.547 0.351
(0.39) (0.51) (0.24) (0.12) (0.30) (0.43) (0.27)
Exports -2.275 -2.267 -2.424 -2.398 -2.257 -2.25 -2.41
(3.14)** (3.14)** (3.23)** (3.20)** (3.08)** (3.08)** (3.19)**
TBILL 0.019 0.017 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.45) (0.41) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
∆TBILL
TBILL*TD/GDP
FIX 0.438 0.438 0.442 0.446 0.55 0.547 0.567 0.565 0.469 0.47 0.56 0.557 0.578
(0.92) (0.92) (0.93) (0.94) (1.15) (1.14) (1.17) (1.17) (0.98) (0.98) (1.16) (1.15) (1.18)
MANAGED 0.201 0.168 0.211 0.18 0.21 0.179 0.237 0.203 0.231 0.197 0.216 0.185 0.245
(0.75) (0.64) (0.78) (0.67) (0.78) (0.67) (0.86) (0.75) (0.84) (0.73) (0.79) (0.68) (0.88)
FLOAT -0.239 -0.262 -0.244 -0.27 -0.276 -0.297 -0.258 -0.284 -0.214 -0.244 -0.266 -0.288 -0.246
(0.78) (0.85) (0.78) (0.87) (0.89) (0.95) (0.82) (0.90) (0.67) (0.77) (0.84) (0.91) (0.76)
Constant -3.012 -2.918 -2.965 -2.875 -2.997 -2.913 -3.025 -2.932 -3.143 -3.035 -3.057 -2.97 -3.092
(8.48)** (8.74)** (7.99)** (8.32)** (8.32)** (8.59)** (8.01)** (8.33)** (5.73)** (5.83)** (5.85)** (5.90)** (5.54)**
Observations 1000 1000 976 976 994 994 970 970 976 976 994 994 970
pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09
N crisis 112 112 111 111 111 111 110 110 111 111 111 111 110
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
3
2Table 5 (concluded)
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
REER MIS -0.113 -0.263 -0.258 -0.094 -0.079 -0.105 -0.099 -0.269 -0.269 -0.113 -0.111 -0.124 -0.126
(0.19) (0.44) (0.43) (0.16) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) (0.45) (0.45) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21)
OPEN 3.037 2.748 2.811 2.959 3.032 2.959 3.027 2.731 2.774 2.969 3.023 2.968 3.02
(4.07)** (3.76)** (3.87)** (3.95)** (4.08)** (3.93)** (4.05)** (3.74)** (3.81)** (3.97)** (4.06)** (3.95)** (4.03)**
R/STD -0.15 -0.153 -0.164 -0.14 -0.151 -0.141 -0.152 -0.147 -0.153 -0.14 -0.146 -0.14 -0.146
(2.04)* (2.15)* (2.32)* (1.98)* (2.15)* (1.97)* (2.13)* (2.02)* (2.09)* (1.91)* (1.97)* (1.89)* (1.96)*
TD/GDP 0.575 0.57 0.585 0.478 0.533 0.538
(1.82)* (1.84)* (1.83)* (1.06) (1.18) (1.19)
CRED -1.43 -1.489 -1.481 -1.389 -1.404 -1.425 -1.42 -1.493 -1.49 -1.396 -1.41 -1.436 -1.437
(2.65)** (2.82)** (2.81)** (2.70)** (2.74)** (2.64)** (2.64)** (2.82)** (2.82)** (2.72)** (2.75)** (2.66)** (2.66)**
PUB. DEBT 0.656 0.65 0.638 0.652 0.512 0.538 0.556
(1.74)* (1.78)* (1.76)* (1.77)* (1.04) (1.10) (1.13)
Growth 0.184 -0.48 -0.622 0.312 0.151 -0.41 -0.494 0.344 0.246
(0.14) (0.38) (0.50) (0.24) (0.12) (0.32) (0.38) (0.26) (0.18)
Exports -2.386 -2.307 -2.297 -2.459 -2.43 -2.267 -2.247 -2.418 -2.388
(3.17)** (3.15)** (3.14)** (3.23)** (3.21)** (3.11)** (3.10)** (3.21)** (3.19)**
TBILL 0.006
(0.14)
∆TBILL -0.017 -0.019 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.018
(0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26)
TBILL*TD/GDP 0.019 0.025 0.005 0.016 0.007 0.016
(0.32) (0.44) (0.09) (0.28) (0.12) (0.27)
FIX 0.573 0.44 0.444 0.556 0.552 0.574 0.571 0.461 0.471 0.556 0.564 0.575 0.581
(1.18) (0.92) (0.93) (1.16) (1.15) (1.18) (1.18) (0.96) (0.98) (1.15) (1.17) (1.18) (1.19)
MANAGED 0.209 0.206 0.175 0.216 0.184 0.244 0.209 0.224 0.204 0.213 0.194 0.242 0.219
(0.76) (0.76) (0.65) (0.80) (0.69) (0.88) (0.77) (0.82) (0.74) (0.78) (0.71) (0.87) (0.79)
FLOAT -0.275 -0.25 -0.276 -0.269 -0.291 -0.25 -0.278 -0.224 -0.238 -0.271 -0.279 -0.25 -0.263
(0.85) (0.80) (0.89) (0.86) (0.93) (0.79) (0.88) (0.70) (0.75) (0.86) (0.88) (0.77) (0.81)
Constant -2.986 -2.962 -2.873 -3.001 -2.916 -3.031 -2.935 -3.001 -2.946 -3.005 -2.952 -3.039 -2.976
(5.63)** (7.97)** (8.31)** (8.32)** (8.59)** (8.01)** (8.33)** (7.72)** (7.71)** (8.07)** (8.05)** (7.67)** (7.64)**
Observations 970 976 976 994 994 970 970 976 976 994 994 970 970
pseudo R2 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
N crisis 110 111 111 111 111 110 110 111 111 111 111 110 110
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
3
3Table 6: Benchmark Estimation of Crisis Probability (from CA). Liquidity Measure: Reserves to Total Debt from WB.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
REER MIS -3.226 -0.062 -3.124 -0.111 -2.813 0.025 -2.674 0.008 -3.202 -0.114 -2.927 0.028 -2.757
(2.96)** (0.10) (2.80)** (0.19) (2.53)* (0.04) (2.35)* (0.01) (2.82)** (0.19) (2.60)** (0.05) (2.37)*
OPEN 5.62 4.049 5.633 4.001 5.544 4.197 5.551 4.244 5.778 3.999 5.695 4.205 5.69
(4.81)** (5.22)** (4.81)** (5.09)** (4.70)** (5.27)** (4.71)** (5.23)** (4.86)** (5.09)** (4.77)** (5.27)** (4.76)**
R/TD -4.734 -3.018 -4.758 -3.017 -4.604 -2.877 -4.618 -2.963 -5.124 -3.059 -4.95 -2.972 -4.955
(3.71)** (3.79)** (3.73)** (3.70)** (3.56)** (3.55)** (3.58)** (3.57)** (3.89)** (3.67)** (3.72)** (3.55)** (3.73)**
STD/TD 0.905 0.888 1.095 1.079 0.955 1.155 1.138
(BIS) (1.88)* (1.84)* (2.13)* (2.10)* (1.96)* (2.24)* (2.21)*
CRED -3.299 -1.475 -3.407 -1.392 -2.961 -1.339 -3.078 -1.365 -3.582 -1.39 -3.128 -1.337 -3.266
(4.03)** (2.91)** (3.94)** (2.61)** (3.45)** (2.59)** (3.46)** (2.51)* (4.07)** (2.61)** (3.61)** (2.59)** (3.60)**
STD/TD 2.678 2.747 2.585 2.621 2.801 2.696
(WB) (2.61)** (2.67)** (2.49)* (2.52)* (2.67)** (2.55)*
Growth 0.925 -0.553 1.18 0.26 1.06 -0.601 1.308
(0.44) (0.44) (0.55) (0.20) (0.49) (0.47) (0.59)
Exports -1.9 -2.223 -1.999 -2.368 -1.82 -2.282 -1.931
(1.47) (3.08)** (1.53) (3.16)** (1.40) (3.10)** (1.46)
TBILL -0.22 -0.011 -0.207 -0.021 -0.208
(1.81)* (0.25) (1.69)* (0.52) (1.69)*
∆TBILL
TBILL*TD/GDP
FIX 1.224 0.457 1.202 0.47 1.229 0.595 1.204 0.62 1.306 0.461 1.329 0.576 1.303
(1.79)* (0.95) (1.76)* (0.97) (1.79)* (1.21) (1.75)* (1.26) (1.90)* (0.95) (1.92)* (1.17) (1.88)*
MANAGED 0.583 0.232 0.567 0.249 0.528 0.239 0.511 0.268 0.686 0.242 0.635 0.223 0.618
(1.24) (0.87) (1.20) (0.92) (1.11) (0.89) (1.07) (0.98) (1.43) (0.89) (1.32) (0.83) (1.28)
FLOAT -0.252 -0.143 -0.256 -0.149 -0.372 -0.183 -0.378 -0.163 -0.206 -0.163 -0.342 -0.211 -0.342
(0.47) (0.46) (0.48) (0.47) (0.67) (0.58) (0.68) (0.51) (0.38) (0.51) (0.61) (0.66) (0.61)
Constant -3.574 -3.184 -3.59 -3.168 -3.477 -3.179 -3.496 -3.205 -2.661 -3.091 -2.605 -3.026 -2.622
(6.55)** (9.03)** (6.50)** (8.84)** (6.34)** (8.90)** (6.30)** (8.76)** (3.59)** (6.59)** (3.52)** (6.57)** (3.52)**
Observations 567 1000 565 976 561 994 559 970 565 976 561 994 559
pseudo R2 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.1 0.15 0.1 0.15 0.08 0.16 0.1 0.16
N crisis 51 112 51 111 50 111 50 110 51 111 50 111 50
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
3
4Table 6 (concluded)
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
REER MIS 0.007 -3.116 -0.127 -2.757 0.03 -2.594 0.013 -3.346 -0.161 -2.923 -0.016 -2.877 -0.027
(0.01) (2.78)** (0.21) (2.46)* (0.05) (2.26)* (0.02) (2.87)** (0.27) (2.54)* (0.03) (2.42)* (0.05)
OPEN 4.245 5.626 4.011 5.536 4.194 5.541 4.241 6.735 3.805 6.645 4.051 6.617 4.102
(5.22)** (4.80)** (5.10)** (4.68)** (5.27)** (4.68)** (5.22)** (4.92)** (4.55)** (4.86)** (4.72)** (4.82)** (4.72)**
R/TD -3.062 -4.765 -3.015 -4.604 -2.877 -4.619 -2.962 -6.139 -2.715 -5.996 -2.667 -5.968 -2.75
(3.59)** (3.72)** (3.70)** (3.53)** (3.55)** (3.55)** (3.57)** (3.95)** (2.95)** (3.85)** (2.87)** (3.81)** (2.90)**
STD/TD 0.875 1.086 1.069 0.888 1.095 1.085
(BIS) (1.81)* (2.09)* (2.06)* (1.82)* (2.12)* (2.10)*
CRED -1.349 -3.472 -1.398 -2.968 -1.336 -3.106 -1.362 -3.482 -1.413 -3.11 -1.335 -3.14 -1.381
(2.48)* (3.96)** (2.62)** (3.42)** (2.58)** (3.44)** (2.50)* (3.98)** (2.65)** (3.58)** (2.58)** (3.49)** (2.54)*
STD/TD 2.747 2.778 2.576 2.612 2.717 2.57 2.603
(WB) (2.59)** (2.69)** (2.48)* (2.50)* (2.63)** (2.47)* (2.49)*
Growth 0.156 1.012 -0.531 1.374 0.257 0.143 -0.326 0.388 0.414
(0.12) (0.48) (0.42) (0.64) (0.20) (0.06) (0.25) (0.17) (0.31)
Exports -2.424 -2.138 -2.235 -2.273 -2.38 -2.014 -2.193 -2.04 -2.355
(3.18)** (1.63) (3.06)** (1.71)* (3.13)** (1.53) (3.02)** (1.54) (3.13)**
TBILL -0.024
(0.57)
∆TBILL 0.111 -0.026 0.153 0.007 0.159 0.007
(0.82) (0.39) (1.09) (0.10) (1.13) (0.10)
TBILL*TD/GDP -0.17 0.031 -0.169 0.02 -0.166 0.021
(1.65)* (0.67) (1.68)* (0.45) (1.62) (0.45)
FIX 0.598 1.16 0.467 1.191 0.597 1.163 0.623 1.196 0.508 1.218 0.618 1.204 0.645
(1.21) (1.69)* (0.96) (1.73)* (1.22) (1.69)* (1.26) (1.75)* (1.04) (1.78)* (1.25) (1.76)* (1.30)
MANAGED 0.25 0.54 0.243 0.505 0.241 0.486 0.271 0.491 0.281 0.441 0.259 0.431 0.292
(0.91) (1.14) (0.90) (1.06) (0.89) (1.02) (0.99) (1.04) (1.02) (0.93) (0.95) (0.91) (1.05)
FLOAT -0.198 -0.279 -0.157 -0.385 -0.181 -0.391 -0.161 -0.363 -0.112 -0.5 -0.165 -0.503 -0.138
(0.61) (0.52) (0.50) (0.70) (0.57) (0.71) (0.50) (0.67) (0.35) (0.89) (0.52) (0.90) (0.43)
Constant -3.03 -3.525 -3.174 -3.389 -3.177 -3.409 -3.204 -3.076 -3.318 -2.975 -3.269 -2.983 -3.309
(6.36)** (6.36)** (8.85)** (6.16)** (8.88)** (6.13)** (8.75)** (4.92)** (7.77)** (4.81)** (7.92)** (4.74)** (7.61)**
Observations 970 565 976 561 994 559 970 565 976 561 994 559 970
pseudo R2 0.1 0.15 0.08 0.16 0.1 0.16 0.1 0.15 0.08 0.16 0.1 0.16 0.1
N crisis 110 51 111 50 111 50 110 51 111 50 111 50 110
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
3
5Table 7: Crisis Probability and Institutional Development (Financial Variables).
STD(BIS) STD(WB) TD(WB)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A
REER MIS -12.759 -13.421 -12.8245 -5.539 -6.028 -5.5205 -6.1115 -6.5615 -6.251
[4/4] [4/4] [4/4] [4/4] [4/4] [4/4] [4/4] [4/4] [4/4]
RES -1.826 -1.887 -1.2955 -1.1785 -1.3635 -0.4215 -4.8805 -6.9565 -7.397
[4/4] [4/4] [2/4] [4/4] [3/4] [1/4] [3/4] [4/4] [3/4]
Growth -5.511 -9.073 -4.6 -1.6665 -1.94 -2.8 -2.136 -1.5755 -2.437
[0/4] [0/4] [0/4] [1/4] [0/4] [1/4] [0/4] [0/4] [0/4]
Governance . 0.1935 . . 0.0985 . . 0.0685 .
. [0/4] . . [0/4] . . [0/4] .
Panel B
Capitalization 0.421 1.429 0.411 0.916 3.067 0.353 1.333 3.406 0.338
(0.54) (0.84) (0.28) (1.85)* (2.58)** (0.53) (2.51)* (2.88)** (0.43)
Turnover 0.035 -1.212 4.397 -0.244 -1.116 2.635 0.1 -0.71 0.063
(0.04) (0.72) (1.94)* (0.31) (0.96) (1.49) (0.13) (0.63) (0.05)
Credit 1.012 -0.823 0.685 1.472 1.751 1.541 2.114 2.276 0.423
(0.99) (0.44) (0.50) (2.23)* (1.96)* (1.76)* (3.05)** (2.46)* (0.38)
Net. int. Margin -25.345 -130.057 9.795 -13.039 -76.03 65.147 -10.935 -85.625 47.469
(1.46) (2.25)* (0.26) (0.68) (1.76)* (1.78)* (0.62) (2.07)* (1.56)
Gov*Capitalization . -1.573 . . -2.035 . . -1.897 .
. (0.84) . . (2.12)* . . (2.16)* .
Gov*Turnover . 1.017 . . 0.987 . . 1.397 .
. (0.92) . . (1.16) . . (1.69)* .
Gov*Credit . 1.013 . . -0.264 . . -0.225 .
. (0.78) . . (0.44) . . (0.37) .
Gov*Net. int. Margin . 109.849 . . 86.292 . . 88.872 .
. (2.10)* . . (2.00)* . . (2.07)* .
RES*Capitalization . . 0.005 . . 0.571 . . 4.354
. . (0.01) . . (1.57) . . (2.39)*
RES*Turnover . . -6.254 . . -3.665 . . 0.182
. . (1.84)* . . (1.61) . . (0.04)
RES*Credit . . 0.541 . . -0.088 . . 9.425
. . (0.37) . . (0.12) . . (2.09)*
RES*Net. int. Margin . . -40.536 . . -86.703 . . -369.688
. . (1.01) . . (2.32)* . . (2.02)*
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Number of times the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 10% in brackets. Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
36Table 8: Crisis Probability and Institutional Development (Political Variables).
STD(BIS) STD(WB) TD(WB)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
REER MIS -8.175 -8.164 -6.172 -6.285 -6.635 -6.615
[3/3] [3/3] [3/3] [3/3] [3/3] [3/3]
RES -0.437 -0.413 -0.21 0.115 -1.767 -2.334
[3/3] [1/3] [0/3] [1/3] [1/3] [1/3]
Growth -10.903 -10.905 -8.44 -8.694 -9.268 -8.899
[3/3] [3/3] [3/3] [3/3] [3/3] [3/3]
Panel B
Governance 0.434 0.558 0.123 0.32 0.155 0.114
(1.48) (1.41) (0.80) (1.60) (0.99) (0.51)
L&O 0.225 0.233 0.058 0.195 0.08 -0.113
(1.06) (0.66) (0.33) (0.84) (0.45) (0.56)
Corruption 0.087 0.512 0.032 0.292 0.048 0.236
(0.32) (1.47) (0.16) (1.16) (0.23) (0.81)
RES*Governance . -0.109 . -0.164 . 0.281
. (0.45) . (1.54) . (0.26)
RES*L&O . -0.006 . -0.099 . 1.417
. (0.03) . (0.94) . (1.39)
RES*Corruption . -0.395 . -0.186 . -1.14
. (1.80)* . (1.90)* . (0.94)
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Number of times the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 10% in brackets. Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis.
37Table 9: Actual and Optimal Reserves
Actual Optimal Reserves:
Reserves Crisis cost 5% GDP Crisis cost 10% GDP Crisis cost 15% GDP
(%GDP) BIS WB BIS WB BIS WB
Chile
2000 20.0 7.77 9.10 10.16 13.39 11.58 16.05
2001 19.9 0.00 1.81 13.84 11.72 27.57 17.93
2002 21.6 0.12 0.66 19.20 10.66 30.94 16.93
2003 23.9 0.00 0.00 16.18 11.34 31.62 19.66
China
2000 15.9 4.45 6.63 6.58 10.48 7.87 12.86
2001 15.6 5.89 6.31 8.98 9.21 10.83 11.01
2002 18.3 6.88 8.74 9.67 17.52 11.35 22.96
2003 23.0 7.51 12.15 10.48 21.54 12.28 27.36
Malaysia
2000 38.6 – – – – – –
2001 32.7 – – – – – –
2002 34.6 41.49 0.00 57.43 11.64 66.75 20.12
2003 36.1 51.12 2.01 69.17 17.38 79.70 27.04
Thailand
2000 27.8 – – – – – –
2001 26.1 – – – – – –
2002 28.0 38.37 0.00 53.27 19.31 62.10 35.77
2003 30.0 30.31 1.40 43.34 24.82 51.11 39.50
Korea
2000 18.2 – – – – – –
2001 20.8 – – – – – –
2002 24.1 21.80 0.33 34.85 18.87 42.65 30.52
2003 25.5 37.06 17.14 52.08 38.53 60.98 51.86
38Table 10: Implicit Cost of a Crisis and Crisis Probability
Actual Spread Crisis Probability Implicit Cost
Reserves (b.p.) (%) (%GDP)
(%GDP) BIS WB BIS WB
Chile
2000 20.0 197 4.31 0.49 7.6 27.0
2001 19.9 192 3.53 1.66 12.0 17.0
2002 21.6 177 3.30 1.35 10.9 20.1
2003 23.9 126 2.53 1.39 12.3 18.4
China
2000 15.9 136 0.13 0.34 48.8 24.9
2001 15.6 127 0.14 0.15 41.8 40.7
2002 18.3 89 0.05 1.07 77.7 10.6
2003 23.0 57 0.02 0.73 159.6 11.1
Malaysia
2000 38.6 217 – – – –
2001 32.7 237 – – – –
2002 34.6 187 8.84 1.33 3.7 29.3
2003 36.1 151 10.01 1.57 2.8 21.7
Thailand
2000 27.8 163 – – – –
2001 26.1 160 – – – –
2002 28.0 103 5.05 2.87 3.0 12.4
2003 30.0 91 2.60 2.49 4.9 11.6
Korea
2000 18.2 216 – – – –
2001 20.8 211 – – – –
2002 24.1 121 3.04 2.61 5.7 12.0
2003 25.5 106 5.87 4.61 2.9 6.6
39Appendix: Variable Deﬁnition.
REER MIS Lag of real efective exchange rate deviation from Hodrick-Prescott tendency (IFS)
R/STD Lag of Real Reserves to Real Short Term Debt (IFS/BIS, IFS/WB)
R/TD Lag of Real Reserves to Real Total Debt (IFS/WB)
STD/TD Lag of Real Reserves to Real Total Debt (IFS/WB, WB/WB)
Growth Real GDP growth Average of Lags 1 and 2 (WDI)
Exports Lag of Real Exports growth (IFS)
Corrupt 2
nd lag of Corruption Annual Average ICRG(106)
L&O 2
nd of law and Order Annual Average ICRG(113)
Governance 2
nd Lag of Governance (CC)
Capitalization 2
nd lag of Stock Market Capitalization to GDP (Levine et al)
Turnover 2
nd lag of Stock Market Turnover to GDP (Levine et al)
Credit 2
nd lag of Private Credit by deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial inst.s to G
Net int. Margin 2
nd lag of Net interest margin (Levine et al)
Credit x Gov. 2
nd Lag of Interaction between Governance and Private Credit (CC*Levine et al)
Capit. x Gov. 2
nd Lag of Interaction between Governance and Stock Market Cap (CC*Levine et al)
Turnover x Gov. 2
nd Lag of Interaction between Governance and Stock Market Turn (CC*Levine et al)
Net Marg x Gov. 2
nd Lag of Interaction between Governance and Net i Margin (CC*Levine et al)
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